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It is argued that the encompassing concept of welfare rights that is contained within the
Social Policy literature – and which has developed from TH Marshall’s distinction between
civil and political rights on the one hand and social or welfare rights on the other –
provides a clearer and more explicit basis for an international call for the progressive
development of social policies than, for example, the human rights approach to poverty
reduction currently espoused by the UNDP and OHCHR. Social rights continue to be a
relatively marginalised or qualified element of the human rights agenda and may be more
effectively harnessed by way of a welfare rights approach based on a politics of needs
interpretation.
This article is concerned with the relationship between academic Social Policy and the
human rights agenda. It will examine notions of rights from the perspective of Social
Policy as an academic subject1 before presenting a three pronged critique: it will critically
examine recent attempts to frame a ‘human rights approach’ to global poverty reduction;
it will contend that welfare rights have been and continue within contemporary debates
to be marginalised; it will argue for the incorporation of an alternative conception of
welfare rights as a component of the human rights agenda.
Wel fa re r igh ts and human r igh ts
As an inter- and multidisciplinary academic subject Social Policy has championed the
classic sociological formulation espoused by TH Marshall, who identified three kinds of
citizenship rights: civil or legal rights, political or democratic rights and social or welfare
rights (Marshall, 1950). The capitalist welfare state gave expression to the latter. Marshall’s
contention was that in liberal democracies the struggles of past centuries had delivered
first the rule of law and then the universal franchise. However, the crowning achievement
of the twentieth century – brought to fruition following the end of the Second World War –
had been the consolidation of more or less systematic forms of social policy across the
capitalist world, providing certain rights to social security, healthcare, education, housing,
social protection and, for example, legal aid for the poor. Democratic welfare capitalism,
Marshall supposed, would secure equality of status for the individual citizens of nation
states.
It is citizenship rights that have in practice provided the foundations upon which
modern global conceptions of human rights have been constructed (e.g. Clarke, 1996).
The human rights instruments of the modern era – including and particularly the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and its subsequent international
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covenants – generally assert the indivisibility of all human rights, yet they incorporate
the same distinction that Marshall drew between a ‘first generation’ of civil and political
rights that had been defined though past struggles and a ‘second generation’ of rights
identified in the twentieth century. The UDHR characterises this second generation of
rights as economic, social and cultural. Such rights relate to the means by which human
beings obtain their livelihood and the ways in which they are able to participate in human
society. This is by implication the very stuff of Social Policy. More explicitly, the United
Nations 1993 Vienna Declaration has asserted that ‘extreme poverty and social exclusion
constitute a violation of human dignity’ (UN General Assembly, 1993: para. 25). Insofar as
the amelioration of poverty and social exclusion is a fundamental social policy objective,
the human rights agenda ostensibly embraces the concerns of Social Policy.
It is argued, nonetheless, that moral demands for economic, social and cultural justice
are incapable of universal achievement and should not be regarded as human rights at all
(Cranston, 1973); that the language of human rights is not necessarily appropriate to the
pursuit of social justice through public policy making (McLachlan, 2005). Social Policy
has engaged not so much with the idea of human rights as with Marshall’s more specific
concept of social citizenship, and with an encompassing notion of welfare rights: a notion
that loosely captures the economic, social and economic components of human rights in
terms of entitlements created through social legislation and the practices associated with
promoting such entitlements (Dean, 2002). The welfare rights concept has therefore been
essentially pragmatic. It takes into account that social rights of citizenship are shaped
through the exercise of political rights or processes; and that civil or legal rights are
required for the purposes of their enforcement.
The form and substance of welfare rights have always been contestable. Different
‘welfare regimes’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990) function with different notions of rights.
Within the liberal English-speaking tradition there has been a certain tendency to
look upon welfare rights in terms of safety nets for the relief of poverty or national
minima for the prevention of poverty. In contrast, corporatist continental-European
welfare states have tended to see welfare rights as compensatory rights for their nations’
workers, whereas Nordic social-democratic welfare states have been inclined to regard
welfare rather more in terms of universal rights for all citizens. Fundamentally, however,
welfare rights are rights that have in various ways been bestowed or demanded under
capitalism.
In contrast, second generation human rights have been conceptually more abstract
and practically more elusive. The form in which they were encapsulated in the UDHR
owed much to the Cold War tensions of that era (e.g. Hunt, 1996). They represented an
uncomfortable compromise between, on the one hand, a liberal legacy summed up in
Franklin Roosevelt’s celebrated aphorism that ‘a necessitous man is not a free man’ (see
Eide, 2001) and, on the other, attempts by the Soviet communist bloc to inflect the agenda
away from civil and political freedoms in favour of its own interpretation of human rights,
based on state organised economic and social guarantees (e.g. Wronka, 1992). Despite
rhetorical assertions as to the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights,
these tensions as to their substance – and as to the manner of their implementation and
enforcement – led to the development of separate international covenants: one for civil
and political rights, the other for economic, social and cultural rights. Later, with the
collapse of Soviet communism, human rights discourse became – for a time at least – less
of a rhetorical propaganda medium (UNDP, 2000: 3).
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In the meantime, in response to the demands of the global south, the UN through the
1986 Declaration of the Right to Development purported to institute a ‘third generation’ of
human rights. The Declaration was intended, in the words of the Senegalese delegate, to
express for the poorest people of the world ‘the right to live better’. It sought to establish
the principle that all human beings should be enabled to participate in a process of
social, economic and political development (Rosas, 2001: 122). This new generation of
rights incorporated demands for peace, a healthy environment and self-determination.
It implied not only individual rights, but collective, group and solidarity rights. In the
process, however, it did not so much add to the canon of rights already set out in the
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) as bring
an element of ambiguity to the question of whether ‘the right to live better’ was a right
to be demanded by citizens against individual nation states or a right of poor nations to
international co-operation and assistance. Paradoxically, perhaps, this has served further
to marginalise the idea that social or welfare rights may be regarded as a global species
of human rights that could or should in themselves be inalienable and unconditional.
Aspirations based, for example, on group-rights to self-determination and/or cultural
freedom (Kymlicka, 1995; Perez-Bustillo, 2001) seek to enlarge our understanding of civil
and political rights, not economic and social rights.
Within Social Policy there have been concerns expressed as to whether a rights-based
approach to welfare can be sustained in the face of economic globalisation (Mishra, 1999)
and a realisation that the assumptions underpinning the idea of welfare rights do not
readily translate to the poorest nations of the world (Gough et al., 2004). Nonetheless, it
has been argued that it is now feasible at the international level to entertain the possibility
of global approaches to social policy issues (Deacon, 1997). The specific object of this
article is to retrieve a conception of welfare rights and situate it more firmly in relation to
the theories and discourses of human rights.
A human r igh ts approach to pover ty reduct ion?
The intuitively attractive idea of a human rights approach to poverty reduction took hold
with the publication of the Human Development Report 2000 (UNDP, 2000). Chapter 1
of that report was contributed by the Nobel Prize winning economist, Amartya Sen,
who took the opportunity to explore the connection between human rights and human
development. Sen’s argument was that rights nourish our freedom, while development
nourishes our capabilities (see also Sen, 1999). By capabilities, Sen was referring not to the
things that people may be able to do (their ‘functionings’), but to their capacity to choose
and to live a life they value. Human rights may be expressed in terms of goals for human
functioning, but human development depends axiomatically on freedom to achieve those
chosen goals. For Sen, poverty is to be understood as capability deprivation. He draws
upon Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties to make the point that just
because the rights demanded by or on behalf of the poor are neglected or repudiated
by those with the power to honour them, this does not mean that such rights cannot
be inalienable. Sen’s influence on the United Nations Development Programme and on
international financial institutions such as the World Bank has been notable, and yet it
may be argued (Dean, 2002, 2004) that the international establishment has not properly
embraced his central premise.
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The prevailing establishment discourse – which shines through in later chapters of
the Human Development Report 2000 – assumes that human development requires
economic growth; rights require liberal democracy; and both require a pluralistic and
largely de-politicised public realm in which non-governmental organisations and civil
society groups can play a role as much as the state. It is claimed that economic,
social and cultural rights are as important as civil and political rights (UNDP, 2000:
9). And yet, it would seem, the rights that matter most are rights to free trade. Fostering
human development, therefore, is a matter of creating incentive structures, furnishing
appropriate regulation and facilitating participation. Poor countries, it is supposed, should
avail themselves of the opportunities that capitalist globalisation can provide. The later
chapters of the Human Development Report 2000 slip into the discourse of new public
managerialism (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Clarke, 2004; Braathen, 2005): rights to
social development are to be achieved through technocratic processes, requiring such
managerial techniques as self-assessment, benchmarking and culture change.
In the course of the Human Development Report 2000 the term ‘human capital’
is insinuated as if it were a synonym for Sen’s notion of ‘human capabilities’. Sen,
himself has remarked upon the limitations of the term human capital on the grounds
that ‘human beings are not merely means of production, but also the end of the exercise’
(1999: 296). Concepts such as human capital and social capital (e.g. Putnam, 2000)
have become common currency within the dominant discourse. Though they may have
an application within critical sociological analysis (e.g. Bordieu, 1997), as metaphors
in policy discourse they take on distinctly reductive economistic meanings: individuals
are constituted as actual or potential economic actors; societies are constituted as more
or less functional or dysfunctional networks of actors. It is an approach that continues
to reflect essential elements of the economic and political orthodoxy once dubbed the
‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson, 1990). The recipe for tackling poverty still favours
the liberalisation of trade and financial markets, the privatisation and deregulation of
economic production, flexible labour markets, low public spending and taxation, and
selective social ‘safety nets’ (generally, that is, means-tested and/or conditional forms of
social assistance for the poorest). The neo-liberal legacy of that consensus is an enduring
hostility to ‘big’ government and scepticism towards welfare rights.
The Human Development Report 2003 (UNDP, 2003), announced the UN’s
Millennium Development Goals, by which it aims to eradicate poverty and promote
human development in the course of the twenty-fist century. ‘Daunting’ though these
goals are held to be (ibid: 13), the specific aim of halving the incidence of extreme poverty
and hunger by 2015 very clearly does not announce that freedom from extreme poverty
or hunger is an inalienable human right. Implicit here is the principle of ‘progressive
realisation’, provided in Article 2 of the ICESCR, elaborated by the Limburg Principles
promulgated on behalf the International Commission of Jurists in 1986 (see Hunt, 1996:
Appendix 5) and consolidated in 1990 by a General Comment of the UN Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (see Eide, 2001: 22). The later formulations
owe something to the ‘typology of duties’ defined by Shue (1980), who had argued
that state parties to human rights instruments were obliged in the first instance only to
respect rights by not actively violating them (e.g. by not arbitrarily evicting slum dwellers);
second, to protect such rights by preventing their infringement by third parties (e.g. by
regulating the conduct of exploitative landlords); and third, to fulfil such rights to the
extent that resources permit (e.g. through the provision of public or subsidised housing).
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The obligation imposed upon state parties by the ICESCR is that they should take steps
towards the full realisation of social, economic and cultural rights, but enforceable duties
do not necessarily arise directly or immediately. The result, critics complain, is a yawning
gap between promise and reality (e.g. Pogge, 2002). The realisation of all human rights
requires time and resources. But the scale and urgency of the task of addressing world
poverty starkly attest to the failure of the international community universally to implement
an inalienable right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being (as provided
by Article 25 of the UDHR).
Nonetheless, in 2004 the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued
Draft Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies (OHCHR,
2002). It is encouraging that such a document should be published at all, and yet the
Draft Guidelines amount in tone and substance to a sister document to the Millennium
Development Goals and the recent Human Development Reports. The underlying premise
appears to be that poverty is the antonym of development; poverty is construed as much
as a consequence of economic failure as a violation of social rights. The Draft Guidelines
explicitly restate the principle of progressive realisation and seek to establish a set of
indicators and benchmarks to ensure that economic development is matched in time by
social development. The emphasis is on safety nets, good governance and performance
monitoring; upon the interdependence of rights and responsibilities, such that for example
the right to food should be linked to the right to work; upon the accountability of state
parties as well as global actors. The document defines a process for the setting of targets in
relation to rights to food, health, education, work, housing, etc., but, significantly, mention
of a right to social security (provided by Article 22 of the UDHR) is omitted. If poverty
is a violation of rights, the potential of a human rights approach is that it can politicise
that gap between the promise offered by international human rights instruments and the
reality of world poverty (e.g. Lister, 2004). However, the effect of the Draft Guidelines
as presently written is to depoliticise poverty and to collude with a technocratic and
essentially managerial approach to development. In practice, it would seem, the Draft
Guidelines establish social standards, not welfare rights.
The marg ina l i sa t ion o f we l fa re r igh ts
Within the welfare states of the developed world, rights to welfare provision have tended
to be conditional in nature and systemically subordinate to the specific legal and political
context within which they are framed (Dean, 2002). And in the global context, welfare
rights have always been marginal. This was reflected in the way the implementation and
reporting mechanisms provided by the ICESCR were much weaker than those provided
by the equivalent International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Economic and
Social Council created by the ICESCR eventually – in1985 – appointed the Committee
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. The Committee receives quinquennial reports
from state parties, but its jurisdiction is restricted to the making of ‘general comments’.
Since 1992 the Committee has invited submissions from non-governmental organisations
NGOs, but while international NGOs have been active in monitoring civil and political
rights, they have shown less interest in rights to welfare provision (e.g. Hunt, 1996). What
is more, new social movements of the global south and their academic allies – the post-
development theorists – tend to be hostile to the role of the state as a guarantor of welfare,
or else they seek to transcend what they dismiss as the mere ‘politics of demand’ in favour
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of more authentic forms of political participation (Escobar, 1995; Waterman, 2001). That
welfare rights should remain at the margins of the human rights agenda at the beginning
of the twenty-first century – despite burgeoning concerns about global poverty – would
seem to be attributable to two countervailing, but mutually contradictory, hegemonic
preoccupations: one with responsibility; the other with identity.
To observe that rights are related to responsibilities is trite, but true. The relationship
between rights and responsibilities is deeply contested. To an extent, however, a
precipitating factor had been the ‘crisis’ that befell the capitalist welfare states from
the 1970s onwards (e.g. Mishra, 1984; Pierson, 1998). Associated with the shift in the
capitalist world from industrialism to post-industrialism and from Keynesian to monetarist
economic orthodoxy had been the ascendancy of a new ideological consensus. During
what has been characterised as the ‘golden age’ of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen,
1996) there had been a broad, if fragile, consensus between those who accepted collective
responsibility for human welfare (social democrats and social liberals) and those who
accepted mutual obligation and social protectionism (social conservatives and republican
traditionalists). The alternative consensus, promoted initially by the so called New Right,
was one that combined, on the one hand, neo-conservative support from a strong state
and obedience to traditional moral values with, on the other, neo-liberal support for free-
markets and individual responsibility (Gamble, 1988; Roche, 1992). The rights of social
citizenship were brought into question by neo-conservatives because they undermined
the responsibilities of citizens to sustain themselves through paid employment and to
sustain each other within families (Murray, 1984). They were brought into question by
neo-liberals because they undermined the ethical freedoms and correlative civic duties
of the individual property-owning subject (Nozik, 1974).
The inherent tensions within the New Right are more fluidly accommodated in the
‘Third Way’ compromise espoused first by Bill Clinton and then by Tony Blair (Jordan,
1998), but whose influence may been seen not only across Europe (Bonoli and Powell,
2002), but also in a wider global context (Deacon, 2003). Central, nonetheless, to the
Third Way project is the mantra ‘no rights without responsibilities’ (Giddens, 1998: 65).
This entails both ‘new paternalist’ (Mead, 1997; Standing, 2002) and ‘advanced liberal’
(Rose, 1999) elements. New paternalism is characterised by the creeping conditionality
that attaches to the administration of welfare rights not only in the developed world
(Dwyer, 2004), but also in some parts of the developing world (e.g. Cimadamore et al.
2005). Provision of social benefits for the poor is made conditional upon their willingness
to seek employment, undertake training, attend health clinics, and/or send their children
to school. Advanced liberalism is a response to the imagined consequences of capitalist
globalisation, the crisis of trust in institutions and a transition to a ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992;
Giddens, 1994). The provision of human services must necessarily embrace a consumerist
rather than a public service ethic (Le Grand, 2003). The primary role of welfare states
and of social policy in a global context will no longer be to distribute resources or
provide directly for people’s needs, but to enable people individually to manage risks.
The administration of welfare rights, it is supposed, must give way to self-provisioning,
prudentialism and an individualistic ethic of self-responsibility.
A very different challenge to welfare rights dates from what has loosely been called
the ‘cultural turn’ in progressive political thinking (e.g. Clarke, 1999), a turn that more
or less coincided with the crisis of the welfare state. The concept of welfare rights and
social citizenship that originally informed Social Policy was premised on the idea that
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such rights represented the just outcome of a class-based politics that had been concerned
to secure some measure of redistribution within systemically unequal capitalist societies.
Such assumptions have been called into question by intellectual movements that favour
new forms of politics, including a politics of discourse, a politics of identity and a politics
of recognition. The cultural turn in the social sciences entailed the burgeoning of a
variety of critical theoretical traditions, drawing on theories of ideology and language,
symbolic interactionism, social constructionism and post-structuralism, all of which were
fundamentally concerned with the practices by which social meanings are generated.
While this unleashed extraordinary new insights into social relations of power, one effect
was to marginalise the analysis not just of class-based inequalities (Meiskins Wood,
1995), but of social justice and welfare rights as well. Closely allied to this process was
the emergence of new social movements – including second wave feminism, the anti-
racist and disability awareness movements – which drew attention to social divisions
other than class and opened up questions about the way in which individual identities are
constructed through social differences (Taylor, 1998). By celebrating the sources of their
identity, people may demand a different kind of rights: rights not to redistribution, but
to participation, empowerment and to recognition (Honneth, 1995; Fraser and Honneth,
2003).
Such insights have had a major impact upon Social Policy, but our understanding of
welfare rights has tended to trail behind.
Red iscover ing we l fa re r igh ts
T.H. Marshall’s liberal conception of social citizenship has been criticised because he
was inclined to envisage it, abstractly, in terms of an accommodation between competing
principles (the principles of the free market versus those of the administrative state) rather
than, more concretely, as a political compromise between competing classes (Bottomore,
1992). Welfare rights were seen as having been discovered and handed down from above
as a solution to capitalism’s tendency to disequilibrium rather than having been struggled
for and seized from below by organised labour or through the demands of the poor. Bryan
Turner (1990) similarly draws a distinction between ‘descending’ and ‘ascending’ views
of citizenship and he extends this to a discussion of human rights, arguing that such
rights do not merely serve to bolster the autonomy of the human individual, but that ‘it is
from a collectively held recognition of individual frailty that rights as a system of mutual
protection gain their emotive force’ (1993: 507; and see Turner, 2006).
What is entailed in these different notions of both citizenship and human rights
are two different perceptions or understandings of human dependency (Dean, 2004:
chs. 1 and 10). The contractarian perception is averse to dependency and celebrates
independence: it seeks to enable people to engage with one another as freely contracting
parties. The solidaristic perception acknowledges dependency and celebrates human
interdependence: it seeks to enable people to engage with one another in mutually
protective solidarity. Contractarian and solidaristic perceptions exist in tension with each
other. And each in turn may be inflected towards quite different normative interpretations
(ranging from the authoritarian to the egalitarian). By and large, however, it is a spectrum
of essentially contractarian perceptions that has achieved ascendancy.2
Mid-twentieth century social liberalism had been willing to concede rights to welfare
as a means to equality of status and opportunity. The ‘advanced liberalism’ of the new
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millennium is rather more insistent that rights should not precede the responsibilities of
the citizen. Whereas the language of welfare rights was once capable of accommodating
either a contractarian or a solidaristic interpretation, the scope for such ambiguity may
have been narrowed. Recent research on popular discourse in the UK (see Dean, 2004)
would suggest that although a somewhat reluctant awareness of human interdependency
and qualified support for welfare rights continue to survive, the ascendancy of an
ideological discourse premised upon an individualist ethic of responsibility is having
a corrosive affect on people’s ability to interpret and support rights to welfare provision
as a corollary to, or expression of, their own interdependency.
While several of the new social movements that emerged during the second half of
the twentieth century were intent upon celebrating difference and identity, their emphasis
on individual identity was on occasions at the expense of solidaristic interpretations of
rights. For example, elements of the women’s movement have been criticised for middle-
class ethnocentricity (Davis, 1981) and/or for pursuing essentially masculine notions of
independence (e.g. Pateman, 1989); the disabled people’s movement for marginalising the
need that all human beings have for care (e.g. Shakespeare, 2000). It would be a mistake,
however, to suppose that a concern with the issue of human identity must necessarily
lead to an individualistic conception of rights. Taylor (1998) has drawn a distinction
between two aspects of identity: ‘categorical’ and ‘ontological’. Our individual identities
are constructed through a multiplicity of overlapping categorical identities relating to
gender, age, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, abilities, etc. for which we may demand a right
to recognition and respect. Our ontological identity, on the other hand, is what defines
us as unique human beings in terms of the coherence and unity of the ‘self’. Sustaining
categorical identities may entail contractarian claims to equal treatment by the individual
members of a variety of social groups. Sustaining ontological identity, however, entails
solidaristic claims to social protection by or on behalf of unique individuals. Human rights
instruments characteristically assert the inherent ‘dignity’ of all members of the human
family. But, as ever, this may be interpreted in contractarian terms as a claim to the
equal integrity and autonomy amidst a family of atomistic and self-seeking individuals,
or in solidaristic terms as a claim to inclusion and security or ‘asylum’ (in the original
meaning of that word) amidst social diversity. It is this latter interpretation that is under
pressure. The welfare rights tradition could be called upon to interpret a right to social
security under capitalism as a right to asylum from the risks of an exploitative labour
market and/or the risks of poverty in old age; the right to housing as a right to asylum
from the risks of homelessness; the right to social care as a right to asylum from the
risks of impairment and isolation associated with disability. Insofar as human dignity does
require personal autonomy (cf. Doyal and Gough, 1991), this amounts to more than
self-sufficiency (Williams, 1999). Dignity comes through social inclusion. Welfare rights
entail the right be included with dignity in social relations of interdependency.
Though it is not framed as such, one way of reinvigorating the welfare rights tradition
would be through what Nancy Fraser (1989) in her earlier work described as a ‘politics of
needs interpretation’. It is perhaps through a politics of needs interpretation that specific
human needs may be translated into claims and asserted as rights, albeit in a manner that
might combine struggles over the redistribution of resources with identity-based struggles
for recognition (see Fraser and Honneth, 2003). It may be implied (see Fraser, 1997) that
a politics of needs interpretation would require several pre-conditions. It would require,
amongst other things, parity of participation and an end to systemic social inequalities;
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effective dialogue between diverse social groups; that ‘publicity’ – in its literal sense –
be accorded to the ‘private’ needs of women and oppressed minorities. This is a vision
that ushers in the possibility of welfare rights that are demanded and negotiated from the
bottom up; that challenges not only the compromising conditionality of social rights in
the developed capitalist world, but also the inhibited and incremental nature of rights-
based approaches to poverty reduction for the global south; and that suggests ways of
connecting quotidian understandings of human rights with global social policy. It is not a
simple idea, but an attractive one, since it re-establishes welfare rights as unconditional
demands in the face of social injustice, both global and local. It is through the language
of welfare rights and the processes by which they are negotiated that people may lay
claim to the satisfaction of their own needs, while also recognising the claims of distant
strangers. What is more, there are signs that the case for such a paradigm shift is more than
a scholarly preoccupation. For example, though rarely invoking the language of rights, a
draft Social Policy Guidance Note published by the UN’s Department of Economic and
Social Affairs ventures at one point to assert that ‘all the population groups of a country
have a right to a decent life (food, clothing, education, health services, employment
standards, social security, accessible housing, etc.)’ (Ortiz, 2006: 12 [emphasis added]).
Conc lus ion
The broad concept of welfare rights that had been developed within Social Policy is under
threat as the basis of the capitalist welfare state has come into question. At the same time,
it is not a concept that has entered to any significant extent into the prevailing human
rights debate. That debate has struggled to give substance to ideas of economic, social
and cultural rights, but has never ventured to forge a notion of welfare rights that might
have purchase and meaning as much in the global south as in the developed capitalist
world. Recent attempts to define a human rights approach to global poverty reduction
would seem to embody a managerial rather than an emancipatory ethos.
Fraser’s notion of a ‘politics of needs interpretation’ offers one way of expanding and
relocating Social Policy’s concept of welfare rights. It suggests a basis on which to engage
with the global human rights agenda. Conor Gearty (2006: 43) has recently argued that
it is compassion – the ‘active concern for others’ – that can or should be signified by
the term ‘human rights’: it is the term we use ‘when we are trying to describe decency
in our post-philosophical world’ (ibid: 57). This is not necessarily to concur that human
rights provide us with ‘values for a godless age’ (Klug, 2000), because ultimately, I would
contend, human rights are social constructions, not eternal verities. As Ignatieff has put it
rights are not the universal credo of a global society, not a secular religion, but something much
more limited and yet just as valuable: the shared vocabulary from which our arguments can
begin, and the bare human minimum from which different areas of flourishing can take root.
(2001: 95)
The language of human rights undoubtedly represents a discursive resource upon which
Social Policy can strategically draw. The challenge is how concretely to re-establish claims




Earlier versions of this paper were presented under the title ‘From poverty reduction to
welfare rights’ at a conference, Crossing the Boundaries: The place of human rights in
contemporary scholarship, organised by the Centre for the Study of Human Rights at the
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title ‘Reconceptualising welfare rights’ at a conference, Globalisation and the Political
Theory of the Welfare State and Citizenship, organised by the Network of Political Theory
in Denmark, at Aalborg University, Denmark on 4–5 May 2006; and under the title ‘The
significance of the human rights agenda for the future of social policy: imminent threat or
strategic opportunity’ at a Social Policy Research Centre Seminar, University of New South
Wales, Sydney, Australia, 20 July 2006. The author is grateful to Natalie Samarasinghe
and Pinar Uyan for helpful comments on earlier versions and for suggestions made by
two anonymous referees.
Notes
1 The convention I adopt in this article is to use a capital ‘S’ and ‘P’ when referring to Social Policy as
an academic subject and a lower-case ‘s’ and ‘p’ when referring to social policy as substantive intervention
for the promotion of human welfare.
2 There are, albeit indirectly, potential parallels between this author’s argument (the initial seeds of
which were contained in Dean 1999) and the account of human rights rendered by Woodiwiss (2005).
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